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Abstract
Open source projects produce goods or standards that do not allow for the appropriation of private
returns by those who contribute to their production. In this paper we analyze why programmers will
nevertheless invest their time and e®ort to code open source software. We argue that the particular
way in which open source projects are managed and especially how contributions are attributed to
individual agents, allows the best programmers to create a signal that more mediocre programmers
cannot achieve. Through setting themselves apart they can turn this signal into monetary rewards
that correspond to their superior capabilities. With this incentive they will forgo the immediate
rewards they could earn in software companies producing proprietary software by restricting the
access to the source code of their product. Whenever institutional arrangements are in place that
enable the acquisition of such a signal and the subsequent substitution into monetary rewards, the
contribution to open source projects and the resulting public good is a feasible outcome that can be
explained by standard economic theory.
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frankfurt.deWho can a®ord to do professional work for nothing? What hobbyist can put three man-years
into programming, ¯nding all bugs, documenting his product, and distribute for free?a
OSS poses a direct, short-term revenue and platform threat to Microsoft, particularly in server
space. Additionally, the intrinsic parallelism and free idea exchange in OSS has bene¯ts that are
not replicable with our current licensing model and therefore present a long term developer
mindshare threat.b
aOpen Letter to Hobbyists by Bill Gates, Feb. 3rd 1976
bHalloween Memorandum I by Microsoft, Aug. 11th 1998
1 Introduction
All over the world, computers run a variety of programs and communicate over networks linked by
protocols that are generated in the open source domain. Ever more electronic devices like mobile phones
rely on open source products and thrive on the standards that are established by a community that not
only includes single hackers working in their leisure time but also the giants of the commercial world like
IBM and Motorola. Linux looms as its °agship among other prominent success stories such as sendmail or
Apache. Linux develops operating software for almost every electronic device and is especially successful
in the market for server software: In 2001 it had a market share of 25% compared to Microsoft Windows
with a share of 49%.1 The Linux program was originally developed by Linus Thorvalds in 1991, then
a student at Helsinki University. Its kernel was based on Unix which came in half a dozen proprietary
versions at that time. Instead of generating proprietary software, Thorvalds made his program code
accessible for other programmers and invited them to contribute on a voluntary basis.2
This leads us to the most striking characteristic of open source software: free access to the product
and to its source code. This characteristic is legally embodied in what is called the 'General Public
License' (GPL)3 - sometimes also referred to as 'copyleft'. Ensuring that the source code of a software
program remains open, it states that everybody may run, copy, modify and distribute the program under
the terms of the original license. Though the sale of modi¯cations is not prohibited, the public shall be
free to access and use any modi¯ed source code. Therefore the prices of open source products beat those
of their proprietary counterparts and whoever wishes to do so can download the latest version of the
1See Deutsche Bank Research (2002, p.7).
2For a more extensive description of the history of Linux, see http://www.linux.org/info.
3For the GNU General Public License see http://www.opensource.org/licenses/gpl-license.html. A good discussion can
also be found in Kaisla (2001).
1product for free.4
Since no one can exercise ownership of the original product in the sense of excluding others from the
right to use it under the GPL, revenues from transferring or licensing this right prove elusive. In turn,
this implies that the community of involved code contributors and debuggers can not claim any monetary
compensation for their time and e®ort! Even more astonishing is the fact that both quantity and quality
of the contributions nevertheless have such an extent that these products seriously compete with those of
software giants like Microsoft.5 Not surprisingly the phenomenon of open source has generated a growing
interest in the academic community.
Central issue and related literature At ¯rst glance the existence and the success of open source
systems (OSS) is equally puzzling for economists and surprising for their closed source system (CSS)
competitors. They particularly marvel at the eagerness of obviously highly skilled agents to work for free
to provide a public good: Why would rational programmers grant their time and skills to a non-pro¯t
OSS-project instead of taking up a career in a CSS-¯rm like Microsoft where they would get paid for
their work?
To answer this question, the public opinion often alludes to an ideological rebellion against commer-
cialism and the reign of near-monopolists such as Microsoft. In the same manner, a considerable strand of
research has taken recourse to psychological motives such as altruism and dogma. The main idea behind
these propositions is that there exists some intrinsic motivation, some sort of emotional satisfaction har-
vested from unsel¯sh behavior.6 But there are also less idealistic theories, those which refer to external
rewards. Lakhani and von Hippel (2000) emphasize the advantages of user-to-user based feedback sys-
tems and the intangible utility user-developers extract from combining both activities. OSS programmers
pro¯t both by learning on the production side and by obtaining a better product on the consumption
side. Johnson (2002) models this e®ect and shows that in certain circumstances the free-riding problem
in the provision of the public good can be overcome: Whenever the ratio of the individual bene¯ts from
the use of such software to the individual costs of production is su±ciently high in comparison to the
likelihood that some other agent develops a solution, the agent will take part in an OSS-project.
Other contributions stress that the more people join this community, the higher are the individual
4Additional services such as manuals or related service packages are sold by di®erent distributors who compete mainly
in the areas of service, support and training.
5See for increasing evidence Economist (2000), Economist (2001) and Economist (2002).
6See Hars and Ou (2002) for some data on motivations to work for OSS-projects.
2bene¯ts. Rapid feedback by the very best in each speci¯c ¯eld or project allows for very rapid advancement
along the learning curve by individual programmers.7 Another group of ideas resorts to the value of peer
recognition among software programmers. This line of reasoning argues that programmers act in order
to be appreciated by their fellows and for this purpose like to show o® their abilities. Even hobbyists,
if seriously devoted to their pastime, are habitually embedded in a community where performance is
compared and acknowledged and reputations for expertise can be earned among the like-minded.
Our approach is similar in spirit to the last one, but di®erent insofar as it adds material compensations.
We join works such as Lerner and Tirole (2002) and Mustonen (2003) who claim that this kind of
recognition can be transferred to the outside and moreover be translated into monetary rewards. In
this view, contributions to the program are not so much unsel¯sh donations or the pursuit of vain self-
grati¯cation, but rather future-oriented investments which are based on career concerns. In the words
of established economic theory, ventures in the world of open-source are undertaken for the sake of a
credible job market signal as described by Spence (1973). How does this work?
Open Source as signalling A close inspection reveals that the OSS is organized such that every
signi¯cant contribution can be traced back to the original author. In one of the biggest OSS-projects, the
Linux kernel, there exists a public changelog ¯le which lists all those programmers who have contributed
to the o±cial source and their speci¯c inputs.8 Naturally, not everyone makes it onto the list. Each
proposal to modify the code undergoes a peer review process and only those modi¯cations sanctioned by
the referees make their creators legitimate authors. The authors' names and contributions are recorded
in the changelog ¯le which is an honoring and a sign of expertise among the programmers.9 This is
where the theory of peer recognition stops, but not the one on career concerns. For, if peer recognition
theory presumes that information is revealed inside the community, why not admit that the same signal
could also reduce the information de¯cit of people from the outside? Prerequisite for this is the existence
7The systemic features of the OSS are described in Raymond (2000a) where he likens the processes of the OSS to a
bazaar in contrast to the 'cathedrals' that are crafted by proprietary software ¯rms with their products.
8See e.g. Moon and Sproull (2000) and Raymond (2000b).
9In the case of Linux, the changelog ¯le portrays a pyramid-like hierarchy among the contributors. See
http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.1. The changelog ¯le classi¯es di®erent programmer types
just as there are di®erent kinds of contributions ranging from documentation over debugging to more complex developing
tasks. We interpret this as evidence that any kind of programmer has the potential to signal his level of skill, but none
which is higher.
3of some suitable and convenient mechanism to transfer the signal beyond the domain and thus educate
outsiders about the superior ability associated with it.
In general, it seems reasonable to assume that the knowledge about skills is less uneven among
programmers than between them and outsiders. A spot in the credits thus serves as a valuable signal
on a job market characterized by asymmetric information. Imagine a personnel manager faced with two
candidates A and B who claim to deserve excellent pay. Suppose both certify basic programming skills,
yet A in addition proves that he has contributed important modules to the Linux code. Who of them is
more likely to get the higher salary? If the Linux graduate is indeed rewarded a premium, it pays o® for
him to have spent the e®ort on OSS programming.10 The ex ante expected value of the deferred pay-o®
makes striving for the signal worthwhile since the unrestricted access to the Linux kernel code and its
changelog ¯le allows for the right interpretation and honoring even by outsiders ex post.
When does the signal work? The signal can cross the borders of the OSS community, precisely
because the source code is open. To function well, however, it must be su±ciently visible and credible.
Otherwise, potential employers will either not receive the signal or will not (fully) rely on it. Consider
what a signal means to them: its quality corresponds with their willingness to pay its bearer a wage
premium. In other words, the value of the deferred pay-o® depends on the properties of the emitted
signal. Visibility is achieved by a broad distribution of the product and a well-known brand. We argue
that the e®ect of the number of OSS programmers on this criterion is signi¯cant: First, the number of
developers raises the number of users directly. Secondly, a higher number of developers augments the
quality of the product, the acceptance of which will therefore rise among the less sophisticated users. A
possible third e®ect, an inter-linkage of the ¯rst two, would be conceivable, if user-developers were mainly
avantgarde-users and industry trendsetters.
The credibility of a signal grows with the superiority of the refereeing process and the total number of
proposed modi¯cations. To understand this, recall the information that a signal carries: "This program-
mer has met the standards set by the referees and has prevailed among many modi¯cation proposals to
earn this spot in the changelog ¯le." Though the level of the standards and the number of competitors are
not directly observable, they are usually implied by the quality of the product, which in turn a®ects the
distribution and the visibility of the product. We propose that this visibility and therefore the credibility
10Lerner and Tirole (2002) speak of a deferred pay-o®.
4of the signal rise with the number of programmers.11
In the previous example, a good signal would therefore evoke the following conclusions in our personnel
manager: "Candidate A has drafted vital modules for the Linux program. Linux is a prominent brand.
(This is the reason why I would know of it.) Since the product is widely known and used (especially by
software experts), it must be good. Apparently, Linux has high quality requirements and a lot of good
programmers involved. (Otherwise, the product would not be so successful.) So, if this guy has made it
into the changelog ¯le, he must be very skilled. We should o®er him an adequate salary."
On the whole, visibility and credibility, which rise with the number of programmers in the OSS,
positively a®ect the deferred pay-o®s and thus make the signal more valuable.
Competing for the deferred payo® By the preceding account, good programmers should altogether
work and acquire a signal at the OSS. If the number of programmers had only positive e®ects, it would
be bene¯cial to have as many OSS colleagues as possible. But additional programmers can also have
negative e®ects on their co-workers' acquisition of a deferred payo®: The story we have told is not yet
complete, and the point we have not discussed so far is that after acquiring the signal the programmers
have to ¯nd an employer who values the signal enough to pay a wage premium for it. But if there is
only a limited number of ¯rms in related industries that can bene¯t from knowing a programmer's type
and are thus willing to pay a premium for those who can prove their superior productivity, this creates
competition among the bearers of signals.
This raises the question, why a ¯rm in a related industry would be willing to pay this kind of
wage premium anyway. One reason for this would be a highly complex production process in which
only outstanding programmers can actually add value whereas ordinary programmers either can not
contribute to the product at all or even have a negative e®ect on their co-workers productivity. Hiring
a less able programmer would thus be a waste of money. Given that the monetary returns from these
products are high enough, there is an incentive to attract those programmers, who can prove their high
level of productivity, by o®ering a wage premium to them. Thus, in sum, each programmer in the OSS
exerts a positive and a negative externality on his peers. His participation increases the value of the
deferred payo®, but at the same time decreases the probability of obtaining it! We will therefore model
the expected value of the deferred payo® such that it ¯rst rises and then falls in the number of OSS
11This is obvious for the quantity of proposed modi¯cations, but not so for the quality of the referees. For intuition,
consider how the competence of scouts will probably rise with the overall popularity of basketball.
5programmers.12
What about signals in the closed source systems? Evidently, the hitherto sketched mechanism
would only induce programmers to an OSS career, if the discounted expected deferred pay-o® were
higher than the expected wage in a CSS-¯rm. But why would we presume that CSS-¯rms do not
di®erentiate wages after the ¯rst year of employment or so, for, if they did, little would remain of the
OSS' attractiveness? One important reason is that, in the absence of an OSS, there is no incentive to do
so. Why should the CSS-¯rm concede to its employees a signal, which enables them to market themselves
to outside ¯rms? Once they have it, they could threaten to leave the ¯rm in order to renegotiate their
salary. Should there be a supply shortage on the labor market, the ¯rm would have to give in, lest it
would lose its most able programmers. Thus, the CSS-¯rms' best strategy would be not to grant such a
signal in the ¯rst place. In the presence of an OSS, a CSS-¯rm can react in two ways: On the one hand,
if the provoked drain of programmers was negligible, so might the incentive to change the wage structure.
On the other hand, if the threat was considerable, more e®ort might be undertaken to di®erentiate wages.
Nowadays, there is indicative evidence of CSS-¯rms' attempts to emulate OSS-like production and reward
structures.13 It is not clear, however, where this will take them.
Aim and structure of this paper In essence, we argue that a signalling mechanism is at work for those
who contribute to an open-source product that is distributed for free. In contrast to that, the restriction
of an undisclosed source-code in a traditional software ¯rm necessarily limits the transparency concerning
individual contributions, resulting in a more levelled wage for programmers of di®erent productivity. As
a consequence, under certain circumstances some high potentials might prefer to invest their resources in
an OSS-project. We aim to show the conditions for such a result in a model.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 sets up the basic model. An equilibrium analysis is under-
taken in section 3 before in section 4 the equilibria are further analyzed in a comparative statics way for
the e®ect that changes in important parameters can have. The implications of our model are discussed
in section 5.
12See Mustonen (2003) for a di®erent model of the expected payo® function.
13Microsoft introduced a philosophy called 'Shared Source' under which terms it grants di®erent users some insights into
the source code of its Windows operating system. HewlettPackard introduced 'Corporate Source' to reap some bene¯ts of
the processes at work in the OSS.
62 The model
2.1 The programmers
We assume
1. a total population of n programmers consisting of nA programmers of type A and nB programmers
of type B. That is, n = nA + nB.
2. that type A generates an output of qA, type B produces qB, while e®ort levels are constant and
costs of e®ort are equal for both types, which implies that there is no moral hazard. By assumption,
qA > qB.
3. the information regarding his type is private knowledge for each agent. Thus, the labor market is
subject to asymmetric information.
4. the programmers are risk-neutral and completely patient, i.e. they have a discount factor of one.
2.2 The institutions
In our model we distinguish two types of institutional arrangements that software production can take
and between whom all programmers have to make a career choice: an open-source system (OSS) and
a closed-source system (CSS).14 Both possible systems are stylized as having an identical production
function and a di®erent remuneration method.
2.2.1 The production function
We assume
1. the two institutional arrangements possess identical production functions which are speci¯ed as
the sum of the individual productivities of all programmers working for a representative ¯rm or
project in the respective system. This additive production technology employs human capital as
the sole production factor and is a function which is homogenous of degree one. Therefore, the
marginal return of one additional programmer always equates his individual productivity qi (qA or
14Surely, a mutually exclusive choice between either CSS or OSS is not very realistic. However, it adds clarity to the
central propositions. Without harm to the main results, one could instead view working for the CSS as any activity in
which the e®ort (otherwise spent on OSS programming) is invested and which yields some kind of immediate bene¯t.
7qB). Formally, this production function can be stated as follows
Qj =
n
j
X
i=1
qi = n
j
AqA + n
j
BqB for j = OSS;CSS (2.1)
where n
j
A and n
j
B represent the number of type A and B programmers in the respective system. If
we denote the fraction of nA working for the CSS with ® (where 0 · ® · 1) and the fraction of nB
working for the CSS with ¯ (where 0 · ¯ · 1), then the production functions for the respective
system can be rewritten as
QCSS = ®nAqA + ¯nBqB
QOSS = (1 ¡ ®)nAqA + (1 ¡ ¯)nBqB:
2. Qj denotes the aggregate output in a representative ¯rm in the CSS or a particular project in the
OSS. It can be interpreted as the quality of the software product and its thereof derived degree of
distribution among users. In the case of the CSS, we equate QCSS to the revenues earned by the
sale of its products. In the case of the OSS, where no proceeds are reaped, QOSS is a proxy for its
visibility and credibility.
2.2.2 The wage function (CSS)
While having the same production function, the two institutions are substantially di®erent in terms of
remuneration. The CSS uses the proceeds to pay wages to the programmers, whereas the OSS lacks
those proceeds. At the OSS, programmers work for free and receive - if anything at all - a signal which
is rewarded in monetary terms only in later periods.15
We assume
1. a CSS-¯rm cannot (or does not want to) distinguish between the two types of programmers as it
has no access to a su±ciently e®ective or inexpensive screening technology.
2. outstanding performance during a CSS career does not lead to higher wages. The closed-source
technology implies certain limits to the transparency on di®erent programmers' contributions so
that the individual output is not veri¯able. Though a type A programmer can demonstrate his
programming skills within a particular company, the CSS-¯rm initially has no incentive to grant
15Empirically, this extreme case rarely exists. Many programmers contributing to the OSS are employed by commercial
¯rms and are either implicitly allowed or even explicitly expected to take part in the community of a speci¯c OSS-project.
8him a signal which could be used to seek a better paid job somewhere else. With no such signal at
hand, any outside company would at best o®er him some pooling wage, leaving him no better o®.
Therefore he is not in the position to threaten termination of his contract. Knowing this, the ¯rm
has no incentive to increase his wage.
3. the CSS chooses the wage level as to realize zero pro¯ts.
Our assumptions imply that the earnings equal to QCSS are shared evenly among all CSS programmers.
Everyone gets the same wage
w(®;¯) =
QCSS
nCSS =
®nAqA + ¯nBqB
®nA + ¯nB
(2.2)
with nCSS denoting the total number of programmers working for the representative CSS-¯rm. The sum
of the wages always equals the total output QCSS for any given level of ® or ¯. The following ¯gure
illustrates the relationship between the fraction of type A and type B which join the CSS and the wage
they consequently receive.
Figure 1: The wage function
2.2.3 The deferred pay-o® function (OSS)
Programmers at the OSS are not paid wages, but can generate signals which indicate their productivity.16
The value of such a signal is the discounted value of the resulting deferred pay-o®. Since it cannot be
16Remember that this is a strong statement that need not to hold empirically. Any wage that is paid by a commercial ¯rm
earning money from open source software, e.g. a distributor, only strengthens the incentives to take part in OSS-projects
for individuals. To concentrate on the signalling e®ect that we want to analyze with our model, such additional rewards
are neglected. See also fn. 15.
9earned with certainty, programmers must calculate their bene¯ts on the basis of expected values: namely
the value of the associated deferred pay-o® weighted with the probability of obtaining it.17 We assume
that
1. the value of the deferred pay-o® associated with a signal is positively related to the signal's visibility
and credibility, which QOSS is a proxy for. According to equation 2.1, QOSS rises with nOSS. The
logic is as follows: The more programmers cooperate, the better will the joint product be. The
better the product is, the larger will its distribution be. And the more prominent the product is,
the more visible and credible will the signal be.
2. the probability of obtaining a deferred payo® is negatively correlated with the degree of competition
among programmers. We assume competition to be a function of nOSS as well. As more program-
mers join while the number of outside ¯rms o®ering a wage premium for the discovery of type A is
¯xed, it gets increasingly di±cult to realize the deferred payo®. The likelihood that a programmer
will actually earn a wage premium for his signal thus decreases.
3. combining the two e®ects described in (1) and (2) results in the following shape of the deferred
pay-o® function: its value ¯rst rises and then falls over nOSS. Gradually, the competition e®ect
o®sets and later outgrows the visibility e®ect. At su±ciently high levels of nOSS, the value will
approach zero. When approximating the function, we will assume a level k of nOSS at which the
value actually is zero. k can then be understood as a proxy for the demand for highly skilled
programmers in the related industries.18
4. the value of the deferred pay-o® is also dependant on exogenous mechanisms that allow for the
17Note that the assumption of risk-neutrality and complete patience on the part of our agents allows us to treat discounted
expected deferred pay-o® as if it were neither uncertain nor deferred. For reasons of brevity, we will often omit the attributes
'expected' and 'discounted', while keeping the 'deferred' to indicate that programmers work for free during their time at an
OSS-project. Dropping the assumption of risk-neutrality would alter our results to the extent that ceteris paribus only the
less risk-averse type A programmers would ponder and possibly embark upon an OSS career. Leaving aside the assumption
of complete patience would decrease the present value of the expected signal, thus making the OSS career less attractive.
18The logic behind this is as follows: The higher the demand for very skilled programmers in the related industry, the
higher the number of ¯rms that is willing to pay a wage premium to programmers who can guarantee a high level of
productivity. For example this would be true for IT consulting ¯rms, who cannot a®ord to send programmers of low
productivity to their clients or for the development of very complex software products where the contributions of low
productivity programmers would have to be monitored by more skilled colleagues to protect the overall quality of the
product. Notice that the dimension of k is equal to that of the absolute number of programmers n.
10transfer of information and the willingness of outside commercial ¯rms to pay a premium for the
guarantee to hire a highly productive programmer. Risk-averse principals faced with asymmetric
information on the labor market are prepared to pay a premium for the revelation of the type.19
Furthermore, we assume that such a premium will potentially only be paid for type A whose
productivity is higher and that the maximum pay-o® obtainable for type B is thus bounded by his
productivity. We subsume these elements into the non-negative parameter vi, whereby vB · qB.
5. the deferred pay-o® functions are separate ones for type A and type B, because the changelog ¯le
e®ectively classi¯es the programmers' productivity. The quality and quantity of work becomes
publicly observable and the information asymmetry vanishes in the OSS. That is, the peer review
process of the OSS prevents type B from imitating type A. Therefore, for a given programmer,
competition is dependent only on the number of rival programmers from the same type.20
Assumptions (1)-(4) imply that there exists a unique maximum at which the value of the deferred
pay-o® equals vi. On the basis of (5) we specify separate, independent functions for type A and B. We
approximate them by using quadratic functions of the following form:21
rA(®) = ¡
4n2
AvA
k2
A
[® ¡ (1 ¡
kA
2nA
)]2 + vA (2.3)
rB(¯) = ¡
4n2
BvB
k2
B
[¯ ¡ (1 ¡
kB
2nB
)]2 + vB (2.4)
In equations 2.3 and 2.4, ® and ¯ are the independent variables. The parameter ki denotes the absolute
number of type i programmers at the OSS for which the relevant functions assume the value of zero
due to excessive competition. E.g. the expected deferred pay-o® value for type A equals zero if nOSS
A =
nA(1 ¡ ®) = kA (equivalent to ® = 1 ¡ kA
nA). Obviously, for ® = 1 function 2.3 is also zero. The same
analysis applies to kB and ¯.
The parameter vi is related to the individual productivity qi of the programmers and furthermore
captures the existence and quality of the surrounding markets and the willingness of commercial ¯rms
to honor the acquired signal. vi determines the maximum value of the achievable deferred pay-o® for
19The booming headhunting business shows that this is not an unrealistic assumption.
20Although the competition e®ects for the two types are independent (and therefore imply separate functions), the
visibility e®ect is not. Thus, the deferred pay-o® functions would be separate, but not wholly independent. We will,
however, model independent functions for reasons of simplicity.
21See Appendix A.1 for the derivation of the function.
11the two types, whereas (1 ¡ ki
2ni) are the ® and ¯ values for which the functions reach this maximum.
Figure 2 illustrates the functions described by equations 2.3 and 2.4.
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Figure 2: The deferred pay-o® function
So far we have outlined the basic framework of our model. Its elements are the two types of program-
mers and the two institutional settings with identical production but di®erent remuneration functions,
one paying wage and the other yielding an expected deferred pay-o®. Together, these elements sketch the
decision problem which lies at the heart of our model. In the following section, we will formally analyze
this decision problem for each type.
3 Equilibrium analysis
3.1 Conditions for the existence and stability of equilibria
We assume that ® and ¯ are known with certainty and proceed from the assumption that the e®ects of
individual programmers on the given ® or ¯ are in¯nitesimal. A single agent therefore presumes that
his decision will not a®ect the overall outcome and thus acts as a price-taker with regard to w or r.22
Another assumption that would lead to the same e®ect are myopic agents who have no information about
either of the global population parameters nA, nB, ® or ¯. They would neither know the complete shape
of the remuneration functions nor their position on it, but observe only the locally given w and r. Both
sets of assumptions sensibly rule out strategic considerations and result in a static optimization problem
where agents act solely upon the observed values of w and r. We de¯ne a static equilibrium as follows:
De¯nition 1 A static equilibrium is a situation that is characterized by no inherent tendency for change.
Whenever small deviations in the variables occur, equilibrium is restored.
22Cf. the assumption in Grossman and Hart (1980, p.43).
12Equilibrium is the aggregate outcome of individual decisions of type A and type B agents. To analyze
the decision of the individual programmers we use the following di®erence functions:
¢A(®) = w(®;¯) ¡ rA(®) (3.1)
¢B(¯) = w(®;¯) ¡ rB(¯)
They represent the rationale of a single programmer of the respective type choosing between an OSS and
a CSS career taking the values of ® and ¯ as given. A programmer will opt for the CSS, if the value
of the di®erence function is positive, thus, whenever w > r. Conversely, the OSS will be preferred, if
the value of the di®erence function is negative, i.e. if w < r. Programmers are indi®erent between the
two career paths whenever the value of the di®erence function is zero. Figure 3 illustrates the di®erence
function for type A.
Figure 3: The di®erence function
Even though the in°uence of a single agent is just minuscule, the overall distribution de facto results
from the sum of all individual choices. For further analysis, we de¯ne a gravitation ¯eld as follows:
De¯nition 2 A positive (negative) ¢A establishes a positive (negative) gravitation ¯eld and ® will tend
to increase (decrease). The same holds true for ¯ and ¢B.
Interior solutions For any ® within 0 < ® < 1 or ¯ within 0 < ¯ < 1 to be an equilibrium two
conditions must be ful¯lled: First, the necessary condition is the existence of an interior solution. For
this, the programmers must be indi®erent between the two career paths for a certain value of ®¤ and ¯¤.
This implies that the di®erence function must have a value of zero, i.e. that the following conditions are
met:
w(®;¯) = rA(®) (3.2)
w(®;¯) = rB(¯)
13In addition to that, there must be a tendency to restore ®¤ or ¯¤ in case of small deviations, which
requires the following, su±cient condition, to be met: There must be a positive gravitation ¯eld to the
left and a negative gravitation ¯eld to the right of ®¤ or ¯¤. In this case equation 3.2 satis¯es our
de¯nition of an equilibrium.
Corner solutions In addition to the interior solutions, the right-hand corner solutions ® = 1 and
¯ = 1 as well as the left-hand corner solutions ® = 0 and ¯ = 0 represent potential equilibria. The
necessary and su±cient condition for the right-hand corner solutions to be equilibria is that there is a
positive gravitation ¯eld to its left. Accordingly, the necessary and su±cient condition for the left-hand
corner solutions to be equilibria is that there is a negative gravitation ¯eld to its right.
3.2 The decision of type B
Lemma 1 All type B programmers join the CSS.
Proof: We insert equations 2.2 and 2.4 into 3.1 and get
¢B =
®nA(qA ¡ vB) + ¯nB(qB ¡ vB)
®nA + ¯nB
+
4n2
BvB
k2
B
[¯ ¡ (1 ¡
kB
2nB
)]2 ¸ 0 (3.3)
Since the productivity of type B programmers is the upper bound which the market is willing
to attribute to them, the di®erence function can never be negative for type B programmers.23
Although there is a special case in which the parameters have values that result in ¢B = 0
and the agents are indi®erent between an OSS and a CSS career, this interior solution strictly
features a positive gravitation ¯eld to its right and thereby violates our stability criterium.
It is therefore not an equilibrium. The only viable equilibrium, which ful¯ls our stability
conditions, is the right-hand corner solution. Consequently, type B programmers will always
opt for a career in the CSS. 2
Whenever the possibility of an employment by the closed source system exists, type B programmers
will join this system. This result could be disputed on empirical grounds: There seem to be less skilled
programmers involved e.g. at Linux. We suggest three possible responses. First, we believe that they
are di®erently motivated than our career-concerned investors and that their presence does by no means
have a negative e®ect on our investors. If anything, they are highly welcome since they provide valuable
23This statement holds true, even if we allow for non-independent deferred pay-o® functions as explained under fn. 20.
14debugging. Franck and Jungwirth (2002), in fact, argue that in OSS both groups co-exist in symbiosis
without crowding out each other.
Secondly, in reality many low-end tasks with regard to open source products (e.g. documentation,
maintenance, servicing) are performed in commercial ¯rms which accompany the OSS-project like satel-
lites. It is very much as if the OSS were outsourcing unspectacular tasks, a phenomenon which could
easily be explained by our result. The third reason why less skilled programmers might be involved
in OSS-projects is that when agents do not know their respective type with certainty, the open source
community allows them to discover their ability.
Lemma 1 allows us to restrict ourselves in the following analysis to the case where ¯ = 1. Equation 2.2
can then be rewritten as
w(®) = qB +
nA(qA ¡ qB)
nB + ®nA
¢ ® for ¯ = 1 (3.4)
The wage function for type A given that all type B programmers join the CSS can then be illustrated
graphically as in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: The wage function for type A at ¯ = 1
3.3 The decision of type A
In the following we will analyze the decision of type A, starting with their choice in the absence of any
type B programmers before establishing the results for the case that both types are present.
Lemma 2 If nB were zero, all type A programmers would join the CSS.
Proof: If there were no type B programmers, the CSS wage would be qA at all times. For
nB = 0, equation 2.2 yields w = qA and the di®erence function for type A reads
¢A = (qA ¡ vA +
4n2
AvA
k2
A
[® ¡ (1 ¡
kA
2nA
)]2 ¸ 0: (3.5)
15In this special case with only one type of agent, ¯rms are not at risk of employing a 'lemon'.
No value is obtained by signalling and no rationally acting ¯rm in related industries would
be ready to attribute a premium beyond the productivity of type A. In this special case vA
is bounded by qA and ¢A is always non-negative. From the non-negativity of the ¢-function
it follows that ® = 1 is the only stable solution. 2
Lemma 3 For nB > 0, the necessary condition for a type A programmer to join the OSS is that the
premium attributed to type A, vA, is higher than the productivity of type B, qB, which is also the CSS
minimum wage.
Proof: After substituting equations 2.2 and 2.3 into 3.1 for type A, we obtain ¢A =
®nA(qA¡vA)+¯nB(qB¡vA)
®nA+¯nB +
4n
2
AvA
k2
A
[® ¡ (1 ¡ kA
2nA)]2.
Since Lemma 1 established the fact that ¯ = 1 the above equation can be rewritten to
¢A = qB ¡ vA +
®nA(qA ¡ qB)
®nA + nB
+
4n2
AvA
k2
A
[® ¡ (1 ¡
kA
2nA
)]2: (3.6)
The last two addends are always non-negative and only the ¯rst can have a negative value
within our de¯nition space. ¢A can only assume a negative sign if vA exceeds qB to a su±cient
degree. qB is the lower bound of the wage function and vA represents the maximum value
the deferred pay-o® function can ever assume, qB < vA is thus a minimum condition for the
signalling mechanism to work. 2
Lemma 4 For nB > 0 and vA > qB, there are parameter constellations which allow for a non-positive
value of the di®erence function, which is the su±cient condition for a type A programmer to join the
OSS.
Proof: To prove Lemma 4, we choose the following parameter constellation: kA = 2nA and
vA = qA. Equation 3.6 simpli¯es to
¢A = qB ¡ vA +
®nA(qA ¡ qB)
®nA + nB
+ qA®2
® = 0 results in ¢(0) = qB ¡ vA which is less than zero, if the necessary condition identi¯ed
by Lemma 3 holds. 2
163.4 Aggregate outcome
Lemmata 1 to 4 imply
Proposition 1 The CSS exists in any case. The co-existence of an OSS is possible only under certain
parameter constellations.
The parameter-dependent structure and stability of the equilibria determine at what ratio the type
A population can split up between the CSS and the OSS.
Corollary 1 Some parameter settings establish a separating equilibrium as feasible.
Proof: This follows directly from Lemma 4. 2
A separating equilibrium is instated, when some type A agents rationally choose to forgo a wage
in search for a signal that sets them apart from type B. Some settings even constitute a separating
equilibrium, in which all type A programmers join the OSS. The last case is shown by the fact that
¢(0) · 0 can be obtained as a result for certain parameter constellations. Note that the existence
of multiple equilibria is possible. However, the exact coordination process by which an equilibrium is
reached is not modelled here.
Corollary 2 Even if a separating equilibrium is feasible, it is not necessarily established. A pooling
equilibrium is always a rival option.
Proof: For all parameter constellations ¢(1) > 0 by de¯nition. Recall that r(1) = 0 and
w(1) > 0. That is, the right-hand corner solution is always a possible equilibrium outcome.
2
In a pooling equilibrium, all programmers regardless of their type work for the CSS.
4 Comparative statics
So far, we have shown that the number of equilibria depends on the parameter constellation. We pursue
this line of thought in a comparative static analysis highlighting the e®ect of the parameters nA
kA and
vA in particular. Furthermore, we will look at what happens if the zero-pro¯t condition for the CSS is
dropped allowing it to set its wage arbitrarily.
174.1 Analysis with respect to the population parameters
In the following we will analyze how the outcome is a®ected if changes in the population parameters k
and n occur. We assume that type A is rewarded with a premium by the market that exactly equals his
productivity, i.e. in this section vA = qA holds. As shown by Lemma 1, ¯ = 1 . Although the dimension
of k indeed renders it a population parameter, we will refer to it as the proxy for the demand for highly
skilled programmers in the related industry.24
4.1.1 Equilibria
Lemma 5 The number of equilibria depends on the relation between the number of type A programmers
and the absolute number of programmers for which the deferred pay-o® function assumes a value of zero,
i.e. on nA
kA .
Proof: See Appendix A.2. 2
We can distinguish three cases:
² CASE (a) If
nA
kA
<
1
2
(1 ¡
r
1 ¡
qB
qA
);
only the right-hand corner solution is an equilibrium. Given a certain demand for highly skilled
programmers in the related industries, the number of type A programmers is yet insu±cient to
sustain an OSS project as its overall quality would not provide their signal with enough visibility
and credibility. The CSS exists alone.
² CASE (b) If
1
2
(1 ¡
r
1 ¡
qB
qA
) ·
nA
kA
<
1
2
(1 +
r
1 ¡
qB
qA
);
both corner solutions represent possible equilibria. The number of type A programmers relative to
the demand for highly productive programmers in related industries is so large that the expected
deferred pay-o® would exceed the pooling wage, if enough type A programmers created an OSS.
At the same time, the population is yet too small for an excessive competition e®ect to press the
expected value of the deferred pay-o® back below the wage level. An OSS is a feasible outcome.
24Compare fn. 18.
18² CASE (c) If
1
2
(1 +
r
1 ¡
qB
qA
) ·
nA
kA
;
the di®erence function has two roots of which the left hand one is an equilibrium. It joins the
right-hand corner solution as a possible outcome. The type A population is now so large relative to
the demand for highly productive programmers in related industries that with decreasing ®, from a
certain threshold on, the expected value of the deferred pay-o® again slips beneath the wage o®ered
at the CSS. Due to this competition e®ect, the two remuneration functions now intersect twice.
Figure 5 illustrates the three cases graphically.
- - -
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Figure 5: Changes in the population parameters
Note that the lower boundary condition of case (b) is the necessary condition for a forking of projects.
It denotes a critical mass in the population of type A needed for an OSS-project to possibly subsist.
Lemma 5 implies
Proposition 2 Given a well-developed information transfer mechanism (vA = qA), an OSS can only
emerge, if the type A population is su±ciently large relative to the demand for highly skilled programmers
in related industries.
Note that the above proposition only denotes a necessary condition for the possibility and the sus-
tainability of an OSS . Whether and when an OSS will actually come into existence remains unanswered
by this analysis.
4.1.2 OSS threshold and trigger
Even though the unique intersection between wage and deferred pay-o® in case (b) and the right inter-
section in case (c) yield a value of zero for the ¢-function, these points are no sustainable equilibria.
Nevertheless, they play a signi¯cant role, since they represent a critical threshold. Once ® falls below this
threshold, the industry is drawn away from the monopoly situation where all work for the CSS. Instead
19a duopoly structure of the industry is established where type A programmers can distinguish themselves
from the type B programmers and thereby signal their superior productivity. Any event or action that
pushes ® across this threshold, triggers o® the establishment of a sustainable OSS. Any analysis of such
trigger events aims at answering the above questions of whether and when an OSS emerges.25 We propose
that the closer the threshold is to ® = 1, the more likely is a trigger event.
4.1.3 Discussion and practical relevance: the market for excellence
In our model, the e®ect of nA and kA should always be analyzed in combination. Consider e.g. the
following extreme cases:
1. With kA approaching zero in the limit, the deferred pay-o® curve approximates the function ® = 1.
This also makes sense intuitively: If there was no ¯rm willing to pay a wage premium to those who
earned a signal in the OSS, who would be willing to invest time and e®ort in the acquisition of a
signal? No matter how large the population of workers in that industry were, an OSS would not
emerge. For this reason, the maturing or converging of related industries can help to establish an
open source business model.
2. Conversely, consider kA very high, but nA verging on zero. Despite a high demand for highly
productive programmers, there could be too few good programmers in the industry to create a
prestigious open source project. In this case there would be no incentive for these relatively few
people to invest in the OSS product, as it would not create a visible signal of their ability.
Di®erent constellations of the population parameter nA
kA can signify various evolutionary stages within
one industry or characteristics of di®erent industries. In principle, the emergence of an OSS is driven
by the desire of the better-skilled programmers to emit a signal to set themselves apart from the less
productive programmers. However, our analysis shows that such a development is contingent on the
demand for highly productive programmers in related industries as well as on the number of people who
can tap and exploit this potential.
Which structure will the industry settle on in the long-run? Our guess is that, even though a CSS
mono-existence is always feasible, as long as credible and transferable job market signals can be gained
25E.g. Franck and Jungwirth (2002) consider ideologically motivated donators as those who trigger o® the emergence of
OSS.
20by innovation, i.e. demand for excellence is high, the industry will most likely oscillate around equilibria
with multiple systems - open and closed.
4.2 The importance of information transfer mechanisms
4.2.1 Equilibria
In the preceding paragraph the maximum deferred payo® obtainable for the type A programmers was
assumed to equal their productivity qA. Now we return to the analysis of the general case where the
maximum deferred pay-o® is not preset to the individual productivity. To concentrate on the e®ect of a
change in vA, we assume in this section that the absolute number of programmers for which the deferred
pay-o® function has a value of zero - kA - equals the population of type A programmers, i.e. kA = nA.
The reputation function for type A then simpli¯es to
rA(®) = ¡4vA[® ¡
1
2
]2 + vA:
With this function, deferred payo® will be zero for an ® of either zero or one and the maximum
remuneration value that can be gained by working for the OSS will be reached if the population of good
programmers exactly splits up between the CSS and the OSS.
Depending on the value of vA there exists either just one equilibrium for ® = 1 or a situation with
two possible equilibria: the CSS-only outcome and a mixed outcome with both CSS and OSS in place.
Starting with a low vA any increase in vA will ¯rst establish intersections between the wage curve and the
deferred pay-o® function and then shift the intersections to the extremes. The right-hand intersection of
the wage and deferred pay-o® function is an instable saddle point and represents the threshold separating
the gravitation ¯elds of the other two equilibria (the right-hand corner solution with solely CSS to the
right and the mixed outcome to the left). Figure 6 illustrates three cases with an increasing vA graphically.
- - -
6
6
6 6
® ® ®
w, r w, r w, r
qA qA qA w w w
r r r
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 6: Changes in the institutional parameters
Our analysis leads us to
21Proposition 3 The co-existence of OSS and CSS is only a viable equilibrium if the institutional environs
(or market surroundings) allow OSS programmers to credibly transfer a signal to the market. The higher
the valuation of the market for outstanding performance in the OSS, the more likely is a shift from
mono-existence of CSS to a mixed equilibrium.
4.2.2 Discussion and practical relevance: the rise of information transfer mechanisms
A low value for vA indicates a non-existent or insu±ciently developed market mechanism to remunerate
signals gained in the OSS. The markets in which the OSS is embedded need good information °ows to
substitute future rewards for such signals. The emergence of the internet is a ¯rst driver for an OSS
since it provides more transparency and better means for the transmission of information. A second
driver is the legal institution of the General Public Licence. With the GPL, it becomes legally di±cult
to appropriate any ensuing economic rents generated by contributions towards the OSS and makes sure
that contributions remain open and visible in the changelog. These e®ects are captured by an increase
in vA.
Graphically, this means that the parable shifts upwards and, at some point in time, intersects with the
wage graph. The stable, left-hand equilibrium and the instable, right-hand intersection are established.
Any further increase in the quality and accuracy with which the market takes the information about the
work of type A programmers into account shifts the intersections to the extremes - lowering the threshold
for leaving the CSS and facilitating the emergence of OSS.
Not only these benign e®ects of markets caused by the technological advances in information processing
lead to a lower threshold, but also any mis-pricing that might occur in times of a bubble economy: Akin
to the dot.com bubble up to the year 2000 in the sector of Technology, Media and Telecommunications
(TMT) and the subsequent over-investment in resources in these areas, the over-shooting of the market
also led to an over-investment in open-source projects and possibly over-pricing of high-potential IT
specialists. In our model, an overshooting of the valuation for OSS programmers represented by a
value of vA > qA can have two reasons: On the one hand, ¯rms o®ering career opportunities for OSS
programmers might have a speci¯c production function which employs the signals of their employees as
one production factor, resulting in additional pro¯ts generated by the mere fact that programmers of
high reputation are associated with the company. An example for this is Linus Thorvalds who now works
for Transmeta, an internet startup developing low-power microprocessors in an OSS-like development
22process.26 On the other hand it may well be possible, that potential employers of OSS programmers form
overshooting beliefs about the productivity of these agents. Such uncertainty or overshooting has the
e®ect of triggering new OSS projects more easily as individual programmers try to exploit the trade-o®
between the visibility and the competition e®ect. As the hype and overshooting ebbed away, many of
these promising projects were quietly cancelled.27
4.3 Strategic wage setting
We initially assumed that a representative ¯rm in the CSS sets its wage level such that it makes no
pro¯ts. In this section we drop this assumption to see what happens if the CSS can change the level
of payment to its employees. We still stick with the assumption that there is a uniform wage for all
programmers employed by the CSS. The pooling wage w may now be freely set and varied. We also
assume a parameter constellation that allows for two intersections of the wage curve and the deferred
pay-o® function. To simplify, we assume kA = nA in our formal analysis.
The former wage curve serves as a benchmark. With this wage function given by equation 2.2, pro¯ts
for the CSS are always zero. We denote this case by w0. In contrast to that, we de¯ne arbitrary wage as
the actual wage that the CSS pays all of its employees and denote it by ¹ w.
The minimum arbitrary wage that a CSS-¯rm can pay its employees equals the minimum value of
the zero-pro¯t wage: ¹ wmin = w0
min = qB. Figure 7 shows us four di®erent arbitrary wage levels ( ¹ wmin to
¹ w3). For each wage level, we get di®erent points of intersection between ¹ wj and rA. The lower the wage
level is, the farther apart are the intersections other things being equal. ¹ w3 clearly shows that once ¹ wj
surpasses the maximal reputation vA, there is only the CSS-only equilibrium for ® = 1. Increasing the
wage level reduces the pro¯t zone, i.e. the range between ® = 1 and the intersection between ¹ w and w0.
The sequence of events is as follows: (1) The CSS arbitrarily chooses a wage ¹ w. (2) This wage level
determines the equilibria, (3) which in turn imply the respective level of pro¯t for the CSS-¯rm. We
follow this thread in our analysis.
4.3.1 Equilibria
Imagine the CSS sets an arbitrary wage ¹ w. Programmers make their decision on the basis of this wage.
The di®erence function therefore incorporates ¹ w instead of w0. The same holds true for the condition for
26See http://www.transmeta.com for more details.
27See http://www.sourceforge.net for a listing of inactive projects.
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Figure 7: Strategic wage setting
an interior solution which turns into ¹ w = rA.
Lemma 6 Decreasing the wage by the CSS increases its pro¯ts. Any decrease in the wage level, however,
moves the threshold closer to the CSS-only equilibrium, thereby increasing the chance for an OSS to be
triggered.
Proof: In the symmetric case of kA = nA, substituting 2.3 into the above equation yields
¹ w = ¡4vA[® ¡ 1
2]2 + vA.
Solving this equation for ® gives us the following interior solutions for the rede¯ned di®erence
function:
®¤
1 =
1
2
¡
r
vA ¡ ¹ w
4vA
®¤
2 =
1
2
+
r
vA ¡ ¹ w
4vA
Clearly, there is no solution for ¹ w > vA. For qB · ¹ w · vA, the e®ect which ¹ w has on the
positions of the equilibria can be summarized by
@®
¤
1
@ ¹ w > 0 and
@®
¤
2
@ ¹ w < 0.
For increasing ¹ w the right-hand intersection travels to the left, while the left-hand intersection
(and equilibrium) moves to the right. They meet comprising a tangency point for ¹ w = vA .
After that, no intersection exists. Conversely, decreasing ¹ w augments the distance between
®¤
1 and ®¤
2. 2
The CSS is able to in°uence the position of the equilibrium outcome where both a CSS and an OSS
exist. This allows a determination of the size of the gravitation ¯elds of the two equilibria. E.g. decreasing
the wage level enlarges the negative gravitation ¯eld between the two intersection points at the expense
of the outer ¯elds.
244.3.2 Equilibrium pro¯t
Only the interior solution ®¤
1 is a possible equilibrium besides the CSS-only outcome for the corner
solution of ® = 1. We therefore have two potential settings for any arbitrary wage level below vA and can
calculate the CSS pro¯t per programmer for the two cases by ¼1( ¹ w) = w0(1)¡ ¹ w and ¼2( ¹ w) = w0(®¤
1)¡ ¹ w.
Total pro¯t is then calculated by
¦1( ¹ w) = [w0(1) ¡ ¹ w] ¢ (nA + nB)
¦2( ¹ w) = [w0(®¤
1) ¡ ¹ w] ¢ (®¤
1nA + nB)
Since ®¤
1 is itself a function of ¹ w, the pro¯t functions are solely dependent on ¹ w.
4.3.3 Discussion and practical relevance: Playing ¯elds and strategies
We have two possible outcomes. If we presume that CSS will sensibly avoid to create any long-term
equilibria where it induces a loss, the possible outcomes will range somewhere either to the left of the
left-hand interior solution or to the right of the right-hand interior solution in Figure 7. We call them
the playing ¯elds because these settings require di®erent strategic considerations by the CSS-¯rm.
² Playing ¯eld 1 - Monopoly:
Playing ¯eld 1 is relevant if the CSS exists alone, i.e. while the industry rests in the right-hand
corner solution. On playing ¯eld 1, the CSS will want to maximize its pro¯t ¦1( ¹ w) by setting ¹ w
to its minimum qB. This will increase the chances of OSS triggering.28 This danger will more or
less hinder the CSS from fully exploiting the type A programmers. The CSS needs to trade o® the
pro¯t maximization against safe-guarding its monopoly.
² Playing ¯eld 2 - Duopoly:
Playing ¯eld 2 is relevant when the CSS and the OSS co-exist, i.e. while the industry rests in the
left-hand equilibrium. On playing ¯eld 2, the CSS can pursue two strategies. It can try to reach
playing ¯eld 1 again by setting a wage higher than rA, thereby eliminating the negative gravitation
¯eld and thus tempting type A programmers away from the OSS. It would have to put up with
losses with this foreclosure strategy until the feat is done. This only makes sense if the CSS expects
28In fact, in some situations the CSS may itself create the possibility of an OSS. Consider case (a) in Figure 6. By setting
its wage lower than vA, it actually grants an OSS room to maneuver where there had been none before.
25to be compensated for these by future monopolistic rents. Otherwise, it could accept the duopoly
situation, settle for the left-hand equilibrium and maximize its pro¯t function ¦2( ¹ w).
This implies
Proposition 4 Given the other parameters render the existence of an OSS viable in the zero-pro¯t case,
the CSS - by uniformly varying the wage parameter - is not able to in°uence the number of possible
equilibria without incurring losses. In such a monopoly situation the CSS can reduce the chance of a
trigger event by raising its wage, but the market is always contestable by the OSS.
Note that even if we relaxed the parameter assumptions at the start of this section, we would ¯nd
that, for all constellations, the zero-pro¯t case minimizes the number of equilibria. Thus, the CSS can
never create a permanent situation with less equilibria, if its wage policy remains non-discriminatory.
5 Discussion of the model
5.1 The role of intellectual property
What motivates highly skilled people to commit valuable e®ort to an open-source product? Indeed, they
devote time and resources without being able to recoup their personal investment by retrieving the ensuing
rents. Put brie°y, their labor creates a public good. Any economist would allege that private provision of
a public good should therefore generally su®er from under-investment. Surely, beyond altruism, incentives
to invest ought to be weakened by open access to a good. This is why private ownership plays such a
prominent role in our societies. In fact, it is a de rigueur premise to any market-based economy.
We see institutions actually ful¯l the function of helping investors claim their righteous rents when
investments create a good which is subject to free-riding, plagiarism or imitation. In the case of literary,
dramatic, musical or artistic works, sound records, ¯lms, television programs and inventions, the rights
of the author or the inventor are protected by intellectual property rights, i.e. legal institutions such
as copyrights or patents. The protection of intellectual property rights is not only a matter of law but
increasingly a matter of practicability as it has become visible in the way that the Internet has allowed
its users to breach copyrights for sound recordings of the entertainment industries on a hitherto unknown
scale.
26Generally, one would conclude that the more one is able to restrict ownership over a good, the more
rents can be reaped by its use or sale. The software industry often establishes e®ective property rights
by technically restricting the access to the source code or any modules of their products. The right to
make alterations to the product is reserved for designated programmers who usually only have insight
into parts of the code. For these ¯rms, unrestricted access to their source code would mean abandoning
their property rights and would amount to economic suicide. But that is exactly what the open source
domain implies.
In the line of the above arguments, we should not observe the OSS to survive in economic reality.
Conversely, it is a true surprise that we actually do. Our model tries to unravel this mystery. In our
model, the mediocre programmers at the CSS, who earn more than their productivity, appropriate some
of the better programmers' output. They actually free-ride.29 I.e. while the CSS as a whole establishes
ownership over its product, the better programmers within the CSS can only incompletely gain monetary
reward from their personal contributions. On the other hand, in an OSS, the institution as a whole exerts
no property right over its product, but fosters the establishment of individual intellectual property for
its contributors. This is what our analysis puts forth as a possible explanation for the existence of open
source systems. The driving element is that the systems di®er in terms of remuneration: The CSS pays a
non-discriminatory, pooling wage, whereas the OSS by way of a separating deferred pay-o® function o®ers
better programmers the possibility to set themselves apart from the less skilled and reap the equivalent
of their own marginal product. Given this basic mechanism, we have shown the conditions required for
an OSS to be sustainable in this paper.
5.2 Analogy with academia
To back our arguments, we would like to draw a rather imperfect but nonetheless telling analogy. Why
would a successful university graduate forego years of wage and even spend money to earn a Ph.D. de-
gree? Little of what he produces can be appropriated by him alone. His research is openly published
and particularly accessible to other scientists. He works in what strongly resembles an open source en-
vironment.30 We argue that he seeks a signal to stand out from the common mass of college graduates.
29See Rajan and Zingales (2000) for an excellent model of a stylized ¯rm with unequal endowments in resources between
di®erent stake-holders and their predictions about the allocation of property rights in such a setting.
30Interestingly, there is a bi-monthly magazine for university researchers in Germany entitled opensource - the network
magazine for research assistants. For more information, visit www.opensource-online.de.
27Should he be successful, he creates a signal via the academic degree which also functions on the basis of
peer review and which he hopes will create monetary rewards in some way afterwards.31 Imagine he has
the choice between a certain university U and the ¯rm F. In F he will receive a ¯xed wage. In U he must
pay a tuition for an opportunity to earn his Ph.D. degree.
According to our model, his decision will depend on the following two considerations - given that
F's wage is ¯xed: Firstly, the university will have to o®er a promising research environment in general,
i.e. other talented scientists and Ph.D. students in particular. They represent the reputation of U which
in turn contributes to the value of a degree earned from that university. If their number is too low,
the Ph.D. degree might prove wanting in value and later not yield a deferred pay-o® as high as desired.
Secondly, if there are too many Ph.D. candidates relative to the number of jobs o®ering tenure, the level
of competition (or required quality) is high and the challenge might appear too tough for the aspirant.
In any case, only those who think they are talented enough will tread this path. Otherwise, they will
choose F. In time, institutions such as U may develop a reputation for screening quality, as a consequence
of which vital information transfer mechanisms (e.g. job fairs, student workshops, etc.) may evolve and
establish themselves around them. Conceivable are models of competition and di®erentiation between
such institutions and their environments. Our basic model suggests that there should be an equilibrium
number of Ph.D. students for any such institution and the labor markets in which they are embedded.
6 Conclusion
From our analysis, we can conclude that ¯rst of all an open-source system will never exist alone, though
a closed-source system can. The reasoning is quite simple: If high-end programmers feel a need for
di®erentiation, there will be low-end programmers for whom it certainly is not advisable to choose an
OSS career. If no such need is felt, everyone works at the CSS anyway. Second, the OSS needs a
critical number of high-end programmers relative to the demand for highly skilled programmers in related
industries in order to reach a level of quality and visibility which makes their signals credible. Therefore,
OSS becomes feasible only if the population of high-end programmers is relatively large. Third, a well-
developed mechanism to transfer the signals to the surrounding environs is a prerequisite for OSS. The
job markets must acknowledge the information discovery service of the OSS. As such, it may be that
31See also Franck and Jungwirth (2002, fn.18).
28the OSS must establish a reputation for being a reliable signalling device. Fourth, provided the two
conditions mentioned above hold, there is always a positive probability that an OSS may come into
existence. Although the CSS may reduce this probability by strategically setting its wage, the possible
emergence of an OSS can never be totally ruled out: An equilibrium is viable in which both, CSS and
OSS, co-exist.
A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of the deferred pay-o® function
To approximate the deferred pay-o® function for type A, we use a quadratic function of the form rA(®) =
¡c ¢ (® ¡ ®max)2 + rmax where c, ®max and rmax are the unknown parameters. From our assumptions,
the following three conditions can be postulated: (1) rmax = vA, (2) rA(1) = 0 and (3) rA(1 ¡ k
nA) = 0.
This system is determined as we have three independent equations for three unknown parameters. From
this we get rA(®) = ¡
4n
2
AvA
k2
A
[® ¡ (1 ¡ kA
2nA)]2 + vA. The procedure for type B is analogous.
A.2 Proof of lemma 5
The intercept of the wage function is always qB which at the same time is its minimum value. The
intercept of the deferred pay-o® function varies dependent on nA
kA . We will look at the di®erence function
of type A with vA = qA. For ® = 0, we get ¢A(0) = (qB ¡ qA) +
4n
2
AqA
k2
A
¢ (1 ¡ ka
2nA)2. Rearranging this
leads to
¢A(0) =
4n2
AqA
k2
A
¡
4nAqA
kA
+ qB: (A.1)
In the limits ¢A(0) behaves as follows
¢A(0) = qB > 0 as
nA
ka
! 0
¢A(0) = 1 > 0 as
nA
ka
! 1
¢A(0) = qB ¡ qA < 0 as
nA
ka
!
1
2
Since this is positive for the corner values of nA
kA and negative for a value inside this range, being
monotonous the di®erence function must have two roots for ® = 0 dependent on nA
kA . Figure 8 shows us
its behavior for a steadily increasing nA
kA . The sequence is to be viewed from left to right and top down.
Note that the sign of ¢(0) changes in (b) and (d).
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Figure 8: The e®ect of a changing nA
kA
It should also be noted that in
² (a) there is no intersection
² (c) there is one intersection
² (e) there are two intersections
between the wage and the deferred pay-o® function. Thus (b) and (d) with ¢A(0) = 0 mark not only
the change of the sign of ¢A(0), but also the changes in the number of intersections between the two
underlying functions.
Next, we calculate the exact level of nA
kA . For this, we set ¢A(0) to zero in equation A.1 which after
some rearranging gives us z2 ¡ 2z +
qB
qA = 0 with z = 2nA
k .
Solving this quadratic equation for z yields the following solutions for nA
kA
nA
kA
=
1
2
¢ [1 §
r
1 ¡
qB
qA
]:
Since the term under the root is between zero and one, we get two positive and therefore viable solutions.
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